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In recent months, the international financial system has 
experienced the most severe turmoil since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s—stresses that in September 
2008 came close to completely freezing up the flow of 
credit that is the lifeline of all economic activity. The 
ensuing bankruptcies and fire sales of financial power-
houses, and the government’s interventions, have fun-
damentally changed the structure of Wall Street and 
international financial markets.
At this point, actions by the U.S. Federal Reserve, 
U.S. Treasury, and other countries’ financial overseers 
have brought the financial system back from the brink 
of collapse. The Obama administration and Congress 
have taken further steps, including the enactment of 
an economic stimulus package of unprecedented pro-
portions. Efforts are also under way to identify 
improvements in regulatory and market structures 
needed to address the flaws that produced the crisis. 
Although the real-world impact of financial chaos 
is just beginning to unfold, it is useful at this point to 
contemplate the implications for private foundations 
and the constituencies they serve. I begin with a sum-
mation of the causes of the crisis, and then discuss the 
impact on markets in general and private foundations 
in particular. Next, after presenting a framework for 
analyzing the extraordinarily diverse U.S. private 
foundation sector, I offer some lessons on endowment 
management that foundations might take from the 
ongoing crisis. Finally, I turn to thoughts on how the 
spending plans and program strategies of these institu-
tions are likely to be affected as they survey the dam-
age that has been inflicted in recent months.
Market environMent
In the words of Ben Inker of the investment manage-
ment firm GMO, “In 2007, the world saw the most 
profound bubble in risk assets ever seen, and it is the 
bursting of this bubble [in late 2008] that has led to the 
enormous loss of wealth we have experienced to date.”1
As shown in Figure 1, in 2008, outside the safe 
haven of conventional U.S. government bonds, there 
was no place to hide from the financial storm. U.S. 
stocks, for example, fell by 37 percent (as measured by 
the S&P 500); international stocks (MSCI EAFE 
index), by 43 percent; emerging markets stocks, by 53 
percent; energy stocks, by 23 percent; Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITS), by 38 percent; commodi-
ties, by 36 percent; and hedge funds, by 18 percent 
(through November 2008). Similarly, high-grade U.S. 
corporate bonds declined by 3 percent, high-yield 
corporate bonds by 26 percent, and even “safe” invest-
ments, such as U.S. Treasury inflation-protected 
bonds (TIPS), by over 2 percent. Among all the major 
market sectors, only U.S. Treasury bonds yielded 
positive returns (12%).
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The shock that institutional and individual inves-
tors experienced in the autumn of 2008 was com-
pounded by the suddenness with which the collapse 
across so many markets occurred. The first signs of the 
coming storm appeared in July 2007, when short-
term credit markets seized up and a few heavily lever-
aged hedge funds failed. Still, the U.S. stock market 
went on to achieve its all-time high in early October. 
A further sign was the –9.5 percent return produced 
by the S&P 500 for the first quarter of 2008, but most 
were lulled by the fact that the major market index fell 
by “only” 2.7 percent in the second quarter of the year, 
during which period the first major Wall Street bank-
ruptcy occurred. Through August, the year-to-date 
return on the S&P 500 was –11.4 percent—worri-
some, but perhaps normal, given the amount of con-
cern about the financial system and the economy 
overall. Thus, when the storm finally broke with a 
fury in September 2008, there was tumult throughout 
the financial sector. In the last three months of the 
year, the S&P 500 fell by 23.2 percent, and investors 
were reeling.
The causes of the market bubble are as clear in 
hindsight as they were disregarded in the making. In 
summing them up, it is only fair to draw primarily on 
the insights of investor Jeremy Grantham, a self-
described “perma-bear” whose warnings went unheeded 
for so long:2
Sustained increases in the U.S. money supply, •	
beginning as an antidote to the Y2K fears of 2000 
and augmented in response to the bursting of the 
technology stock bubble in the early 2000s;
As a result, enormous credit expansion, increased •	
leverage, and indebtedness throughout the U.S. 
and, indeed, worldwide economy (private and 
public), evidenced particularly in the housing 
price bubble;
At the U.S. Federal Reserve, the view that bubbles •	
cannot be tackled by authorities and can only be 
allowed to run their course;
A weakening financial regulatory environment;•	
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Figure 1. The crash of 2008 devastated most financial markets, 
leaving few safe havens for endowment investors
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The development over the last 20 years of •	
increasingly complicated financial instruments 
whose market value can be difficult to ascertain or 
whose risk can be easily misjudged;
Marked increase in risk-taking across all markets •	
and investor groups.
In the crisis environment that has prevailed since 
September 2008, monetary authorities, U.S. Treasury 
officials, and their overseas counterparts have focused 
on massive temporary measures aimed at preventing a 
breakdown similar to that which led to the Great 
Depression. Missteps have undoubtedly occurred 
along the way, but recent narrowing of the difference 
between the cost of borrowing by corporations and 
the federal government (the “yield spread”) suggests 
that the medicine may be beginning to take effect. 
Much serious thinking, however, needs to be given to 
addressing the policy and structural faults that produced 
the crisis, and to the potential long-term inflationary 
effects of the medicine that is being administered. 
the Burst Market BuBBle in PersPective
As severe as the current bear market in U.S. equities is, 
the data in Figure 2 reveal that it is not of unprece-
dented proportions. Three such markets in the Great 
Depression era exceeded its damage (return of –55.5%) 
by wide margins. More relevantly, the current bear mar-
ket’s return (at least through March 3, 2009), while the 
lowest of any since the 1930s, is within striking range 
of two more recent severe bear markets: that of the 
2000–02 technology stock bust (–49.1%) and that of 
the 1970s oil embargo (–48.2% in 1973–74).3 
No one can say how this market will play out, but 
the historical record suggests three possible scenarios:
A quick rebound, comparable to what happened •	
after the crash of 1987;
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Figure 2. The current bear market in stocks is the fourth most severe
 since 1926, but is close in scale to that of 2000–02
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A two- to five-year period of market recovery, •	
characterized by returns that are modest in 
comparison with that of the great bull stock 
market of 1982–2000 (S&P 500 average annual 
return of 19.5%), the principal reference point of 
the current generation of endowment managers;
A “lost decade,” comparable to the experience of •	
the stagflation era of the 1970s to early 1980s, 
when the average annual real return on U.S. 
stocks was 0.3 percent.
Of these, the first seems highly unlikely, given the 
excesses that had built up in markets and the gravity 
of the underlying causes of the downturn. The third is 
not out of the question, but it can be averted if the 
monetary policy interventions now under way work 
and if the federal fiscal stimulus package just enacted 
encourages productive economic activity and addresses 
underlying problems working against the long-term 
health of the U.S. economy. 
The most likely scenario is the middle one. Even a 
perma-bear like Grantham believes that the severely 
battered market has left most asset classes so underval-
ued that real (inflation-adjusted) returns of 5.7 per-
cent (small-capitalization stocks) to 10.4 percent 
(high-quality stocks) are possible in U.S. equities over 
the next several years—with generally better returns 
possible in markets that are more undervalued than 
the U.S. market (e.g., international stocks). As impor-
tantly, truly skillful investment managers, taking advan-
tage of buying opportunities not seen in such quantity 
since 1982, should be able to produce returns superior 
to these averages.4 
This guarded optimism, however, must be quali-
fied by the following two cautions:
Markets tend to overshoot every bit as much 1. 
on the way down as they do on the way up, 
which gives credence to the fear voiced by less-
pessimistic managers than Grantham that the 
S&P 500 may yet dip below its low point 
so far (March 2009)—to 600 or worse—
before rebounding. 
The Japanese experience of the 1990s (follow-2. 
ing the crash of that country’s 1980s bull 
market) demonstrates that, despite all that has 
been learned about monetary and fiscal policy 
since the 1930s, experts and policymakers 
may still fail to prevent a decade of lost 
economic growth.
the DaMage to FounDation enDowMents
Comprehensive data on the impact of the market crash 
on private foundations will not be available for some 
time, but the data in Figure 3 are indicative of what has 
happened. Looking at net returns through December 
31, 2008, for 89 foundations, including The 
Commonwealth Fund, as well as the Multi-Asset Fund 
of The Investment Fund for Foundations (TIFF), we 
see that during the 2008 calendar year the average 
return for this group—which includes arguably some of 
the best-managed foundation endowments in the 
country—was –25.3 percent.5 As a result of the market 
crash, the average annual return over the last three years 
was –1.6 percent. The average annual return over the 
last five-, seven-, and 10-year periods has been modestly 
positive, but not enough to keep up with inflation and, 
at the same time, enable foundations to meet their IRS-
required spending rate of 5 percent. In contrast, at the 
end of June 2008, spending- and inflation-adjusted 
returns for all of these periods were decidedly positive 
for these foundations. 
A very rough estimate of how much wealth has 
been lost in the entire private foundation sector can be 
arrived at by using the historical statistical association 
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between market returns (weighted according to the 
typical asset-class allocation of foundations) and year-
to-year changes in foundations’ total assets.6 According 
to The Foundation Center, in 2007, the market value 
of the combined assets of all U.S. foundations was in 
the neighborhood of $670 billion. As a result of the 
market crash, total foundation assets by the end of 
2008 were likely no more than $561 billion—a 
decline of $109 billion, or 16 percent (Figure 4). 
Knowledgeable observers argue that when the actual 
data are in, the decline will prove to be closer to 25 
percent, or $167 billion.  
How the institutions bearing these losses are likely 
to respond to this startling new financial reality, in 
terms of endowment management practices, spending 
policies, and program strategies, will be addressed 
below. But first, it is useful to have a framework for 
thinking about these questions that takes into account 
unique characteristics of the foundation sector.
the Private FounDation sector:  
a FraMework For analysis
Every study of private foundations emphasizes their 
pronounced diversity—by size, mission, goals, business 
model, and program strategies. For the purposes of this 
analysis, it is useful to group the approximately 72,500 
foundations that existed in 2006 (the latest year for 
which data are available) by asset size and by key dif-
ferentiating features of their business models and pro-
gram strategies (Figures 5 and 6).7
With respect to business model, foundations may 
choose to be either perpetual or to spend down assets 
over a designated period. A variation on the spend-
down model is foundations that serve as “pass-
through” conduits for annual giving by donors. 
Corporate-sponsored foundations are of the latter 
type, but so are many very small foundations. While 
there can be significant differences, both the investing 
and spending practices of spend-down and pass-
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Figure 3. In 2008, leading foundation endowments suffered severely 
negative returns, pulling down their long-term average annual returns to levels 
insufficient to cover the 5 percent payout requirement as well as inflation
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Figure 4. As a result of the 2008 market crash, total private foundation 
assets have likely declined by at least 16 percent
Total foundation assets
Source: Trend data, The Foundation Center; estimates, The Commonwealth Fund.
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Figure 5. 270 private foundations with assets of $250 million or more in 2006 
controlled 50 percent of the sector’s resources; the vast majority of the 72,477 
foundations are very small organizations, with assets under $10 million.
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$1 million to $9.99 million; Micro foundations, less than $1 million. Source: The Foundation Center.
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through foundations are generally quite similar. They 
are therefore not analyzed separately here.
On program strategy, foundations may choose to 
use funds principally for conventional charitable pur-
poses—such as subsidizing the costs of building and 
running hospitals, schools, universities, social service 
organizations, and cultural organizations. Or they 
may seek to bring about fundamental improvements 
in society through investments in social infrastructure—
for example, in the case of health foundations like The 
Commonwealth Fund, funding health policy research 
and demonstrations testing better models of providing 
health insurance and delivering health services.8
As shown in Figure 5, we know with a fair amount 
of precision the array of private foundations by asset 
size. It is a very concentrated distribution: the 270 
foundations with assets of $250 million or more in 
2006 controlled 50 percent of the entire sector’s 
wealth, and those with $50 million or more, 71 percent 
of all foundation wealth. Meanwhile, 66,330 founda-
tions with assets of less than $10 million accounted for 
just 13 percent of the sector’s resources.
Much less can be said concretely about the 
frequency within each asset size category of perpetual/
spend-down and social improvement/charitable giving 
organizations, but the data and notations in Figure 6 
provide a close approximation. Setting aside the 
special case of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(whose $33 billion in assets, prior to the recent 
infusion of funds from Warren Buffett, dwarf the Ford 
Foundation’s $12.3 billion, the second-largest 
endowment), the bulk of private foundation assets 
lodge with perpetual mid-size to very large foundations, 
the great majority of which have essentially charitable 
missions. Significantly, the number of perpetual 
foundations dedicated to addressing fundamental 
societal ills is relatively small, and their share of total 
foundation resources is also small.9 Given their share 
Figure 6. Perpetual foundations aiming to address 
fundamental problems in society are relatively few in number 
and control a very small portion of total foundation assets in the U.S.
Spend-down/Pass-through 
(# of foundations)
Perpetual 
(# of foundations)
Assets $15 billion or more (1, with 5% 
of sector assets
Assets $1 billion–$14.99 billion (61, 
with 29% of sector assets)
Assets $250 million–$999.99 million 
(208, with 16% of sector assets)
Assets $50 million–$249.99 million 
(1,245, with 21% of sector assets)
Assets $10 million–$49.99 million 
(4,632, with 16% of sector assets)
Assets $1 million–$9.99 million 
(21,733, with 11% of sector assets)
Assets less than $1 million (44,597, with 
2% of sector assets)
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of sector resources, the following endowment 
management analysis will concentrate on mid-size-to-
large perpetual foundations.
lessons in enDowMent ManageMent FroM 
the Market crisis oF 2008
Over the last 25 years, many well-run large foundations 
have adopted an endowment management model fea-
turing the extensive asset class diversification, shown in 
Figure 7, of 106 such institutions monitored by 
Cambridge Associates. Premised on financial market 
research showing that diversified portfolios with riskier 
assets can produce higher returns, with manageable 
risk, than less-diversified conventional portfolios, and 
drawing on the success of such major university endow-
ments as that of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton in using 
this model, sizable foundations have successively dialed 
down the once-traditional 60:40 allocation between 
equities and fixed income: first to 70:30 (1980s), and 
then to 80:20 or lower (1990s). In doing this, they 
substituted riskier holdings like venture capital, real 
estate, emerging-markets equities, energy, commodities, 
private equity, and hedge funds for conventional stocks 
and bonds—in the end, leaving barebones fixed-income 
allocations to ensure liquidity and bolster returns in the 
event of deflation.
This model worked well through the second quar-
ter of 2008, but faltered in the fall 2008 market col-
lapse—as revealed by the widely reported large drops 
in the value of the Yale and Harvard endowments and 
the data on the recent endowment performance of 
large foundations. Yale’s veteran endowment manager, 
David Swenson, argues that the diversified portfolio 
management model remains valid despite the recent 
experience: “[W]hen you have a market in which any 
type of equity exposure is being punished, it’s going to 
hurt long-term performance.”10 Nonetheless, private 
foundations should consider the following lessons 
from this experience:
As argued by Ben Inker and Jeremy Grantham at •	
GMO, in the post-2003 “risk bubble,” all riskier 
assets became overvalued, all but negating the 
Figure 7. Over the last 25 years, larger private foundations have increasingly 
diversified their endowment portfolios, substantially increasing allocations 
to a variety of equity markets and reducing fixed income allocations
Median % allocation of 106 endowments with median assets of $266 million, June 30, 2008. Source: Cambridge Associates.
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benefits of diversification. Thus, more attention 
needs to be paid to market valuations of asset 
classes, with the aim of underweighting those that 
appear to be overvalued. “Rather than having a 
static allocation to each class of…asset, it makes 
more sense to keep all of them on the menu, 
but shift the [policy] allocations as valuations, 
and therefore risk/return trade-off, shift.”11 To 
many, this advice may smack of market timing, 
a practice almost universally discouraged by 
experienced investors. But the core message is 
to pay more attention, particularly in frothy 
markets, to the relative valuation measures of 
different asset classes available from investment 
consultants. At a minimum, those responsible 
for foundation endowments should adhere more 
rigorously to the discipline of rebalancing to 
policy allocations—and those allocations merit 
more frequent reconsideration, especially in 
periods of excess.
The Yale/Harvard endowment management •	
model requires extensive experience and great 
skill at the staff and trustee level to make it work 
effectively; it is not one likely to be successful 
for amateurs. Not all foundations that have 
adopted the model have the intramural capacity 
needed to ensure its success, even with the help 
of investment consultants. Thus, as shown in 
Figure 8, larger foundations consistently achieve 
more from it than do smaller foundations. 
Furthermore, the spread of the model helped to 
bid up the prices of the risky assets it requires 
and, given the limited supply of truly talented 
investment managers, to generate a supply of 
managers ill-equipped to manage such assets.12 
As a result, enthusiasm in the endowment 
community for the model has probably 
heightened its risk. 
 
Figure 8. Very large foundations are better equipped to execute 
sophisticated endowment management strategies than are smaller ones
Returns are for the five years ending September 30, 2008, for 106 foundations. Source: Cambridge Associates.
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The lesson here is that foundations that have 
adopted the model need to reassess their capacity for 
implementing it effectively. Smaller foundations may 
see as a better course using organizations like The 
Investment Fund for Foundations (TIFF) or the 
Common Fund, which have the expert and experi-
enced staffs required to enhance the chance of success. 
Alternatively, they may wish to eschew such sophisti-
cated approaches altogether and use a simpler, index 
fund–dominated endowment management model.
Certainly, foundations that intend to follow this 
model, but lack the resources to assemble internally 
the high-quality professional investment team needed 
to produce the expected results, should take great care 
in selecting investment consultants and in using a 
fund-of-funds to build specific portfolios.13 
Ensuring liquidity. One of the great surprises of 
the recent crisis was the drying up of liquidity, even 
for asset-rich and debt-free institutions like private 
foundations. While hopefully the freeze-up in credit 
markets that occurred is a once-in-80-years event, the 
lessons of the liquidity crunch that in many ways pre-
cipitated the stock market crash are nonetheless worth 
putting on record:
Many nonprofits, including some foundations, •	
were caught in the trap of investing in poorly 
understood short-term investment vehicles that 
produced higher yields than conventional money 
market or custodian bank short-term investment 
funds. In their reach for yield, some of these 
institutions ultimately found it impossible to 
withdraw funds, or saw the value of supposedly 
risk-free funds decline. Lesson: The purpose 
of short-term cash funds is to provide a safe 
and ready source of liquidity, and the potential 
cost of obtaining a slightly higher yield in a 
nonconventional vehicle outweighs the benefit. 
A further lesson is that endowment managers 
should monitor regularly the holdings in the 
conventional short-term investment vehicles that 
they use.
The securities lending business is well developed •	
and has long been regarded as a risk-free tool for 
increasing the return on an investment pool. This 
proved not to be the case in the recent market 
panic, when fears of counterparty risk and sharp 
declines in the market value of invested collateral 
for loans caused index funds and other pooled 
vehicles with securities lending programs to put 
limits on withdrawals or deny them altogether—
often with no notice to clients, longstanding or 
otherwise. Lesson: Know what ancillary programs 
your index or other pooled funds use; seek 
contractual language guaranteeing liquidity; and, 
if need be, identify such funds not using securities 
lending programs.
The diversified endowment management model •	
adopted by many large foundations creates 
liquidity requirements beyond those arising 
from the foundation’s philanthropic programs. 
Venture capital, private equity, real estate, and 
other partnership commitments are drawn down 
in unpredictable segments over multiyear periods. 
Moreover, hedge funds typically have once-a-
year withdrawal dates and may have lock-ups 
for different vintages of invested funds. In the 
recent crisis, hedge funds put further restrictions 
on partners’ access to their capital. Thus, private 
foundation endowment managers have seen the 
need to pay greater attention to their institutions’ 
liquidity requirements and how best to manage 
them. Some have gone so far as to obtain lines 
of credit, should they be unable to sell securities 
to meet cash needs or unable to sell them at 
anything other than fire-sale prices.
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Learning from the Madoff debacle. The current 
financial crisis has demonstrated that the market 
excesses that develop in a period of intense leveraging 
are rapidly exposed when deleveraging sets in. Bernard 
Madoff ’s Ponzi scheme—said to have involved up to 
$50 billion—demonstrates that deleveraging reveals 
not only legal excesses, but also illegal activities that 
remained sub rosa in a speculative market. The Madoff 
event, where astute investors, including a number of 
foundations (mainly donor-controlled), placed funds 
in a vehicle that no one understood and whose returns 
could not be explained, underscores the enduring 
value of the rule against investing in something that 
one does not understand. This scandal reveals also the 
disturbing extent to which even some foundations 
failed to undertake the due diligence that is essential 
before hiring any external manager or advisor. 
The apparent use of the Madoff scheme by funds-
of-funds also reinforces the lesson that foundations 
should take great care in delegating fiduciary respon-
sibility to such vehicles. While numerous funds-of-
funds are well run and adhere to best-practice due-
diligence procedures, the Madoff episode suggests that 
foundations should first consider nonprofit invest-
ment organizations—created and run for the benefit 
of the sector—when they are in the market for a fund-
of-funds vehicle (although this is not to say that TIFF 
and the Common Fund are not immune to making 
mistakes in picking managers). These lessons are par-
ticularly apt for smaller foundations, which often fail 
to see the need for engaging a trustworthy and skilled 
investment consultant to help guide their endowment 
management decisions.
Seeking out opportunity. A final reminder regard-
ing the aftermath of financial crisis is that adversity 
always creates opportunity. Nearly all astute investors 
expect that the post-crash environment will at some 
point create enormous opportunity—especially so for 
long-term investors like foundations that can weather 
short-term volatility. Real average equity market 
returns for the next several years may be modest by 
historical standards, but given current depressed asset 
prices, skilled investment managers will have the 
chance of a lifetime to achieve superior returns. To a 
considerable degree, only the fittest of hedge funds are 
likely to have survived, for example, and given the 
recent outflow of funds from both conventional and 
hedge fund managers, foundations will find open 
doors at previously inaccessible top-ranked hedge 
fund and other managers.14 Provided that their invest-
ment committees are appropriately staffed for identi-
fying able managers, foundations should be forward-
looking in seeking opportunities that have arisen out 
of the crisis. 
iMPlications For FounDations’ sPenDing anD 
PrograM strategies 
Under federal law, private foundations are required to 
distribute annually at least 5 percent of a rolling average 
of the market value of their assets. Many foundations, 
particularly very small ones, distribute considerably 
more than the minimum; indeed, U.S. foundations’ 
average giving rate (excluding most intramural spend-
ing) in 2007 was 6.4 percent. 
Most perpetual foundations use the rolling-aver-
age value of their assets over the preceding 12 quarters 
to determine their giving in any year. Historically, giv-
ing as a percentage of total assets in any year generally 
rises in bear financial markets and falls in bull markets 
toward the minimum IRS-required payout rate (Figure 
9). This variation in the annual giving rate for all 
foundations occurs for three principal reasons: 1) the 
lag between spending and assets just noted; 2) the 
policy of many foundations to allow their spending 
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rates to drift upward in good times, and their ten-
dency to be slow in adjusting those rates in bad times; 
and 3) the decision of many foundations to engage in 
countercyclical spending in bad times (discussed 
below).
No one can say for certain, but using the strong 
statistical relationship between total giving in any year 
and the lagged three-year average value of total foun-
dation assets, a reasonable estimate of the effect of the 
financial crisis on foundation giving is that it will 
decline by about 6.5 percent, or nearly $3 billion, 
between 2007 and 2009.15 Thus, at least in the short 
term, the effect of the market crash on giving will not 
be as great as it has been on foundation assets. If a 
quick recovery does not occur, however, the full 
impact of the crash will gradually come into play over 
the next several years.
Foundations can be expected to respond differ-
ently to the financial crisis, however, depending on 
their business model, program strategy, and size. 
Perpetual charitable foundations. The federally 
mandated 5 percent spending rate for foundations is 
just barely consistent with the goal of perpetuity, given 
historical market returns. Most perpetual charitable 
foundations, finding themselves with considerably 
higher spending rates as a result of the recent decline 
in value of their endowments, are already taking steps 
to ratchet down spending. As noted above, however, 
because of the widespread application of a spending 
policy based on a lagged three-year average asset base, 
spending by these foundations is unlikely to fall 
immediately by as large a percentage as their assets did 
in 2008. 
Some perpetual charitable foundations will choose 
to set aside their normal spending rate constraint in a 
time of economic crisis and undertake some counter-
cyclical spending where they can clearly identify 
opportunities to sustain their constituency institutions 
and programs. Survey results recently published by The 
Foundation Center, for example, revealed that numer-
ous community foundations, as well as such organiza-
tions as the Kresge Foundation, are doing just this.16
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Figure 9. The annual average giving rate of foundations, 
mainly based on lagging three-year average assets, 
typically rises in bear markets and falls in bull markets
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Nevertheless, the lesson of the 1970s stagflation 
era is still fresh in the minds of foundation managers. 
From 1968 to 1982, many foundations saw their 
inflation-adjusted assets erode by 67 percent or 
more—mainly due to the combination of very low or 
negative investment returns and high inflation, but 
also to maintenance of unsustainably high spending 
rates based on the assumption that the economic and 
financial market malaise would be short-lived. Most 
perpetual foundations, therefore, are likely to be cautious 
about spending significantly beyond their normal 
policy rate in the coming years, at least until there are 
clear signs that the financial system has been mended 
and economic recovery programs successfully launched.
Spend-down/pass-through foundations, and 
very small foundations. As shown in Figure 6, spend-
down/pass-through foundations are rare in the uni-
verse of mid-size-to-large foundations; foundations 
with this business model, like the many very small, 
essentially pass-through foundations, account for only 
a small portion of total foundation sector assets. 
Spend-down foundations, however, have more flexi-
bility for adjusting spending plans than do perpetual 
foundations, and it is likely that in a period of eco-
nomic stress, they will see fit to increase their spend-
ing. As revealed by recent Foundation Center surveys, 
some corporate foundations—particularly those con-
nected to the housing and credit industries—are 
indeed stepping up in a significant way to provide 
relief in beleaguered communities.17 However, if the 
economic recession deepens and corporate profits 
decline further, these sources of foundation giving 
could quickly dry up.
Students of the foundation sector sometimes 
express concerns about the merits of very small 
foundations, owing to the challenges these institutions 
face in establishing and pursuing consistent missions 
and effective programs, as well as to governance issues. 
While their resources are insufficient to have much 
impact in fixing fundamental economic and social ills, 
small foundations have an opportunity during this 
period of economic stress to prove their worth, by 
helping institutions in their communities weather 
difficult times.
Perpetual social-improvement foundations. 
Perpetual social-improvement foundations are fre-
quently described as the venture capital investors of 
the nonprofit and public policy sectors. They are by 
nature long-term investors, working on social and 
economic problems that at times seem all but intrac-
table. To be effective, these institutions need to make 
large upfront investments in research to identify the 
underlying causes and implications of the problems 
they address; they must develop coherent program 
strategies to be implemented over an extended period; 
they need to invest in professionals who through 
career-long work advance understanding of issues and 
develop the expertise for developing and testing solu-
tions; and they must work closely with their grantees 
to communicate the results of their work to influential 
audiences able to bring about the needed social 
changes. Foundations of this type do not just write 
checks: to be effective, they must develop strong intra-
mural capacities giving them credibility in their fields 
and enabling them to develop and implement sophis-
ticated grantmaking strategies, including working 
closely with grantees to design projects likely to pro-
duce results useful to change agents and partnering 
with grantees to communicate the results of research 
to policy audiences. 
Given the long-term nature of the problems they 
address, perpetual social-improvement foundations 
must be particularly prudent in the management of 
their asset bases. As shown in Figure 6, foundations of 
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this type are comparatively few in number, and in any 
specific field, they are typically a rare breed, unlikely 
to be readily replaced should they disappear. With 
some exceptions, foundations of this type can therefore 
be expected to reduce their spending fairly quickly to 
accord with the new realities of their financial 
situations.18 
Perpetual social-improvement foundations that 
are particularly threatened by the financial crisis are 
those that earlier had assets just barely sufficient to 
maintain ambitious grants programs in multiple 
areas—foundations with pre-crash assets of around 
$100 million. Such foundations now find themselves 
in substantially reduced circumstances that necessitate 
rethinking the feasibility of conducting work in mul-
tiple program areas and even the objective of perpetu-
ity. Boards and management of such foundations will 
understandably find decisions on which programs to 
retain difficult, and they will be challenged in accom-
modating spending levels to altered financial circum-
stances. But addressing these issues head-on is prefer-
able to setting the foundation on a slow death course, 
with attending diminishing program vitality. Among 
the options that should be entertained by foundations 
in this predicament is consolidation with another 
foundation, which would ensure the critical mass of 
financial and human resources needed to sustain the 
vitality of programs going forward. As an example, the 
James Picker Foundation, in 1986, transferred its 
assets of approximately $15 million to The 
Commonwealth Fund, thereby giving rise to a national 
program that has contributed significantly to the 
emergence of the patient-centered care movement.
While the reaction of The Commonwealth Fund 
to its endowment return of –27 percent in 2008 will 
not be typical of all perpetual social-improvement 
foundations, it is nonetheless instructive on how these 
institutions will go about addressing a difficult situation.
Recognizing the need to address the pain early •	
rather than to hope for the best, the Fund will 
likely reduce its spending by approximately 15 
percent in 2009–10, and, barring a significant 
market turnaround, another 10 percent in 2010–
11 and 8 percent in 2011–12. Even with these 
steps, the foundation’s annual spending rate will 
rise above 7 percent in the short term.
The Fund will make decisions on where to pare •	
back spending based on strategic priorities, rather 
than simply applying across-the-board cuts. This 
said, no aspect of the foundation’s activities will 
be exempt from consideration for contributing to 
the necessary belt-tightening.
As a value-added foundation working on one •	
of the most complex issues of the day—helping 
the U.S. move toward a truly high performance 
health system—the Fund regards its intramural 
professional staff as its most important asset, 
embodying intellectual capital that has taken 
years to develop and that is poised to make a 
unique contribution in the current favorable 
climate for U.S. health care reform. While the 
foundation will continue to devote most of its 
funds to extramural grants, it will aim to retain 
its skilled and experienced staff, even if the 
intramural share of total spending rises somewhat 
during a period of reduced total spending. To 
the extent that this share rises above the normal 
maximum level set by the Fund’s board of 
directors, however, it will do so only temporarily 
and by a small margin.
Every crisis presents opportunity, and the •	
Fund has undertaken a “strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats” analysis of each of its 
programs. The result will be some reorganization 
of programs to concentrate the foundation’s work 
even more on the strategies that its Commission 
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on a High Performance Health System has 
identified for accomplishing health care reform: 
1) achieving affordable health insurance coverage 
for all; 2) reforming the payment system to 
promote quality and efficiency in health care; 
3) reforming the care delivery system to bring 
about patient-centered, coordinated care; 4) using 
benchmarking to promote high performance 
among health care organizations; and 5) achieving 
accountable leadership for the health system.
Within this framework, the foundation expects to 
be able to maintain its signature activities, including 
uniquely rich Web sites (commonwealthfund.org and 
WhyNotTheBest.org) for those engaged in advancing 
a high performance health system; its International 
Program in Health Policy and Practice; major recently 
launched initiatives to promote safety-net medical 
homes and reduce unnecessary rehospitalizations; its 
work with states to improve health system perfor-
mance; and its Fellowship in Minority Health Policy 
program. Through each program strategy, the founda-
tion will continue particularly to address health care 
disparities and the needs of vulnerable populations.
Rising numbers of uninsured and underinsured 
people, escalating health care costs, and growing rec-
ognition of quality and efficiency shortcomings in the 
U.S. health care system have created a climate, not 
seen since 1993–94, that is highly favorable for health 
care reform. If history is any guide, however, the road 
to reform will not be an easy one and could prove to 
be longer than anyone would like.19 
Moreover, the experiences of countries that have 
long provided health insurance to all of their popula-
tion offer ample evidence that, given the unique attri-
butes of health care systems and marketplaces, the 
search for high performance is a continuing one. All 
countries, regardless of their chosen systems of deliv-
ery, finance, and regulation, struggle with questions of 
resource allocation, technology adoption, health care 
manpower, disparities, efficiency, and accountability 
that make the presence of independent bodies, like 
perpetual foundations, vital to developing and debat-
ing improved policies, as well as to stimulating and 
evaluating practice innovations. The mixed public–
private health care system of the U.S., with its unusu-
ally strong role for for-profit enterprises both in deliv-
ering and paying for services and in influencing public 
policy, makes the role of independent private founda-
tions in reform efforts an especially important one. 
Thus, The Commonwealth Fund will simultane-
ously pare back spending as necessary to ensure that it 
remains a force for the long haul in the quest for 
health care reform, while concentrating its resources 
to help the nation seize the opportunity that lies 
before us. 
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